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.Thus, the neoconservative camp around Bush led by prominent figuressuch as Vice-President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, his Deputy Paul Wol-fowitz, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith23 struck back.Under the label Had-ley Rules the policy toward members of the Axis of Evil was framed in December 2001: Thenew rules put U.S.policy toward Iran in a straitjacket requiring that Iran could never be treated asa sovereign equal on any issue. (PORTER 2006: 22)This indeed was a harsh blow into the faces of all those inside Washington s political estab-lishment, above all the State Department, who sought to improve relations with Tehran.But thiswas already introduced in the aftermath of the U.S.Afghanistan invasion with Iran s UN Ambas-sador Javad Zarif along with Iranian-American professor at Rutgers, Hooshang Amirahmadi,playing central roles and the U.S.State Department and National Security Council being fullybriefed.In 2003 a series of meetings between Zarif and two U.S.officials Ryan Crocker andZalmay Khalilzad took place in Paris and Geneva.Another round of talks was scheduled be-tween Zarif and the U.S.side, but the latter did not show up, as this process had already beentorpedoed by the White House (KRISTOF 2007).23Feith, described by PORTER (2006: 22) as abrasive and aggressively pro-Israel, was mainly responsible, alongwith his two staff members, Larry Franklin and Harold Rhode, for developing details of the regime changepolicy towards Iran.It is further reported that in December 2001, Franklin and Rhode met with ManuchehrGhorbanifar, the Iranian arms dealer in the Iran-Contra affair, in Rome as well as Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK)representatives (IBID.).28 There were also many in Iran s political élite who intended to seize this unique opportunityas Washington was beginning its military occupation of Iraq in April 2003.Conscious of its stabi-lizing capacity of a foreseeable quagmire in Iraq during the post-invasion phase, Tehran workedan extraordinary effort to launch an overall normalization process with Washington.In spring2003, a two-pages proposal24 (ACA 2003) was sent to U.S.authorities, outlining an extensiveframework of negotiations in mutual respect covering areas of concerns for both Washingtonand Tehran.As to the field of terrorism, the Iranians offered decisive action against al-Qaeda ontheir soil as well as full cooperation and exchange of all relevant information. Concerning Iraq,Iran vowed to engage in political stabilization activities as well as the establishment of demo-cratic institutions and a non-religious government, thus countering U.S.concerns of a Shi a lea-dership { l Iranienne in Iraq.The offer also included Iran s promise for ending support to Hamas,Jihad, and Hezbollah, further pressur[ing] these organizations to stop violent actions against civi-lians within borders of 1967. Finally, Tehran proposed to act upon Hezbollah to turn it into a mere political organization within Lebanon. These concessions were certainly made in the hopeof being removed from the U.S.list of state sponsors of terrorism. Not enough, Iran also showedthat it would meet American concerns over its nuclear program.Accordingly, it proposed fulltransparency for security that there are no Iranian endeavors to develop or possess WMD, full co-operation with IAEA based on Iranian adoption of all relevant instruments (93+2 and all furtherIAEA protocols). (all p.1) The latter referred to new IAEA protocols for unannounced snap in-spections, which according to PORTER would have made it significantly more difficult for Iran tocarry on a secret nuclear program without the risk of being caught. (2003: 23) Moreover, Tehrandeclared its willingness to accept the Saudi-initiated Arab League Beirut Declaration25 on a two-States approach for settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
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