Podstrony

• Index
• Tariq Ali Iran in the Eye of Storm, Why Gobal War Has Begun (2007)
• April Gentry Critical Companion to Herman Melville, A Literary Reference to His Life And Work (2006)
• Anne Emanuelle Birn Marriage of Convenience; Rockefeller International Health and Revolutionary Mexico (2006)
• Peter Zarrow China in War and Revolution, 1895 1949 (2005)
• Joan of Arc and the Hundred Years War by Deborah A Fraioli (2005)
• John Leguizamo Pimps, Hos, Playa Hatas, and All the Rest of My Hollywood Friends (2006)
• Fred Bergsten, John Williamson Dollar Overvaluation and the World Economy (2003)
• Terry Pratchett Johnny 01 Joh
• PoematBogaCzlowieka k.4z7
• Lynch Jennifer Sekretny dziennik Laury Palmer (2)
• zanotowane.pl
• doc.pisz.pl
• pdf.pisz.pl
• ministranci-w.htw.pl

[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.Despite theirnumerical advantage, the Americans were unable to make much headway before nearbyGerman reserve Divisions arrived to reinforce the German line.Facing terrain and for-midable German defenses likely to pose a challenge to even the most experienced andwell-trained troops, the American offensive quickly ground to halt.The Americansattacked in a narrow strip of land between the hilly, densely wooded Argonne Forest onthe west and the heights of the unfordable Meuse River on the east that housed strongGerman fortifications that further enhanced their favorable positioning.In the center a13-mile long and 20-mile wide tunnel-like stretch of land gave the Germans a thirdentrenchment on high ground.The Americans battled for four days to reach theKriemhilde Stellung, the strongest line of German fortification.There, the attack halt-ed as terrific traffic jams in the rear prevented food or ammunition from reaching thefront lines.Hardships: Death, Injuries, Disease, Lack of SuppliesMore American soldiers were killed or wounded in September and October 1918,than in any month of battle during either the Civil War or World War II, making this a20 WORLD WAR ICongestion in the rear during the Meuse-Argonne campaign hampered the flow of supplies to thefront, creating additional hardships for American troops engaged in the battle.(Courtesy of theNational Archives)costly period in American military history.26 During these two months, nearly 27,000men died of combat-related wounds.27 In six months of active fighting, the AmericanArmy averaged 43,000 casualties a month, compared to 24,000 a month during WorldWar II and 13,000 a month for the Union Army in the Civil War.The First Army saw45,000 men killed and wounded in first four days of fighting in the Meuse-Argonnecampaign alone.28 The coincidence of this battle with the second wave of the deadlyinfluenza pandemic that swept the globe in 1918 added to the stream of men headed tothe rear.Over the course of the campaign, both enemy bullets and influenza germs seri-ously depleted the American forces and combined to overtax an already fragile supplysystem.During the six-week battle the numbers of men incapacitated by enemy fire(69,832 wounded; 18,864 gassed; 2,029 shellshocked) was only slightly higher thanthose felled by disease (68,760, mostly from the flu). Influenza so clogged the medicalservices and the evacuation system, (and) rendered  ineffective so many men in thearmies that it threatened to disrupt the war, Alexander N.Stark, chief surgeon of theFirst Army later noted.29The official numbers do not tell the full story of the epidemic s impact on the fight-ing effectiveness of the AEF.Many men opted to stay away from army hospitals andinstead chose to remain with their units and let their comrades care for them, or theyhid away in bunkers or the woods until they recovered.For the time that they wereabsent from duty, their units received no replacements for them.Even after they felt bet-ter, many flu victims were severely weakened for weeks after their illness and thereforefought ineffectively.Besides struggling to overcome illness, American soldiers faced other serioushandicaps during the opening days of the battle.The lack of artillery support provedparticularly troublesome.Implementing a rolling barrage required maintaining a goodTHE UNITED STATES IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR 21liaison between the infantry and artillery to keep the shells falling on the enemy as theinfantry advanced, something that came from extensive practice or experience, neitherof which the AEF had.For the individual soldier, this meant facing the risk of friendlyfire when American artillery shells fell short or facing German machine guns that theartillery had failed to locate and destroy.Part of the problem was faulty communicationbetween the infantry and artillery.Another difficulty was an early AEF decision to armtheir units with heavy French 75mm and 155mm guns that improved their firepower,instead of light howitzers that were easier to maneuver in battle [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]