Podstrony

• Index
• May Peter Wyspa Lewis 2 Czlowiek z Wyspy Lewis
• Peter Charles Hoffer The Brave New World, A History of Early America Second Edition (2006)
• Van Roy Peter, Haridi Seif Concepts, Techniques, and Models of Computer Programming
• Godwin Peter Gdzie krokodyl zjada słońce. Wspomnienia
• Peter Berling Dzieci Graala 02 Krew królów
• May Peter Wyspa Lewis 1 Czarny Dom
• Follet Ken Wejsc miedzy lwy (2)
• Montgomery Lucy Maud Okruchy swiatla
• Codewarrior Principles of Programming
• Applied Multivariate Statistics
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.Politically, after the Qing turned to reforms in the wake of the Boxer debacle, those very reforms created forces demanding further change.Elections for provincial assemblies in 1908, for example, only increased demands for a constitution.It is worth noting that, although 90 percent of the new assemblymen were gentry who had received a traditional Confucian education, 30 percent of them had chosen to re-educate themselves in a more Western curriculum, either in a Chinese new-style school or abroad.16 Such men were older and more traditional than the revolutionaries, but they can no longer be called ignorant of the world.This is not to say that the new elites were disinterestedly seeking the national good.The “railway rights recovery” movement described above, for example, was designed to make money for its leaders.Public moneys paid for the new schools, but their fees were too high for ordinary folk.But the point here is simply that public institutions expanded faster than the Qing could control them.From a mixture of motives, urban-based gentry demanded a degree of local autonomy within a constitutional framework.If the Qing were unwilling or unable to provide this, the dynasty’s natural constituency could turn against it.Once revolutionary violence began to spread in 1911, the new elites, cooperating with military allies, moved in to lead the revolution with few apparent regrets.In the view of this third school of 1911 historiography, local elites feared popular violence.They wanted to make sure the radicals who had fomented the revolution did not claim power.They opposed land reform and unions.The provincial leaders who emerged in 1912 were usually of the new elite; it was no accident that the 1911 Revolution took the form of provincial secession from the Qing Empire.The third school’s emphasis on fundamental social factors minimizes the implied teleology of the events described.Since the forces that finally tipped the balance to revolution were committed primarily to reform, events could have had a different outcome.Nor does 1911 lead in a straight line to the Communist Revolution.In the words of Joseph Esherick, “Nineteen eleven1911: History and historiography43was a victory for the increasingly Westernized urban reformist elite.As a major step in the alienation of the Chinese elite from the masses, it was more a precondition than a model for Mao Zedong’s peasant revolution.”17 Yet the attention social historians have paid to the new elites has its own teleology.It is not one of revolution, but it remains closely tied to the thesis of modernization – though in China’s case a blocked modernization.Western social scientists have argued that, as China’s ties to the world economy increased, society required more bureaucratic and professional specialization.A traditional sacred or quasi-religious worldview had to be replaced by scientific and technological progressivism.However, this produced a growing gap between a “Westernized” elite to whom national unity had become critical and a populace slower to change.Ultimately, the very reforms necessary to modernize China seemed to fracture its social unity.Traditionally, Confucianism and the institutions of the imperial state had carefully distinguished the classes while linking them together in a system of shared values.By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, urban elites were creating a modern culture increasingly distant from that of the countryside.This view, however, seems to me to overstate the economic dynamism of the “urban reformist elite,” while neglecting their commitment to political change.Certainly, they were conservative in their concern with their property rights, and disliked “chaos,” but they already knew 1911 was not simply a new twist in the dynastic cycle: it was a revolution leading to a new form of government based on new principles of legitimacy.As we will see in the next chapter, the Chinese of the day understood the events of 1911 and 1912 as a story of a national political uprising designed to replace an autocratic monarchy with a republic.This was the clear “public script” read by all the political actors and most of the urban audience.Structural breakdown during the QingAll three schools have contributed enormously to our knowledge of 1911 [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]