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.that are intended to commemorate thenational holidays of the German people, but which solely and verifiablydue to difficulties in procuring facilities or due to operational reasons(e.g.shift changes) cannot take place on 1 May.61 Although this deci-sion was certainly not financially insignificant for the Nazi Party, itssymbolic meaning seemed to be the overriding factor, because it helpedemphasize the legitimate and official character of these celebrations.Around the same time as this entertainment tax decree, a direc-tive issued by the regional propaganda chief of Cologne, ToniWinkelnkemper, showed that professional zeal among Party function-aries was much reduced, just three years after the Nazis came to power.Winkelnkemper decreed that monthly film screenings.are to be considered compulsory Party events, to be supportedby the relevant authorities using all available means.According toreports submitted by the film office directors, it has emerged thatmost local group leaders have utterly failed in providing their localgroup film office directors with the support they need to implementpreparatory work, such as propaganda and ticket sales, and were alsootherwise completely passive.62Winkelnkemper concluded by saying that he expected more com-mitment and participation in the future from Political Leaders.It cer-tainly offers pause for thought when Nazi functionaries were showingso little appetite for even these events which, in light of their characteras entertaining media, ought be seen as rather enjoyable professionalduties.After all, the programmes offered by the regional film officeswere certainly not limited to just educational films made by the Party,but actually consisted mostly of commercial entertainment films.63 Inthis development, one could read either the persistence or the steadyerosion of an originally soldierly self-image on the part of the personsinvolved.While it suggests a persistence in the sense that such filmsmay have been considered as frivolous and unsoldierly , what is moreconspicuous, and what caught the eye of Nazi leaders, is the disciplinarylaxity it displayed towards following orders most likely as a subsidiaryeffect of having become accustomed to the comforts of power and itsnot infrequent material advantages. The Pleasures of being a Political Soldier 219To combat this apparent weakening of the soldierly ethic, a standardexpression became common in the Party s lower ranks that one wasserving on the front.Although this expression certainly fit the ideal, itprovoked considerable criticism from the Reich Minister of Propaganda,Joseph Goebbels, who complained that it artificially created .a con-trast to the work of the central Party headquarters, degrading it to a rear position.This was neither accurate nor acceptable: The frontline of the Party exists wherever National Socialist men are fightingfor the good of the German people and against its enemies, regardlessof whether they stand before a crowd delivering a speech, or they sitbehind a desk formulating policies for our movement. 64 An internaldifferentiation in self-perception according to one s rank in the Partyhierarchy was a danger to be avoided at all costs.IIIThe work dissatisfaction that had been growing among Party func-tionaries since the mid-1930s, as evidenced by numerous reports, wasa multifaceted phenomenon.On the one hand, in the years since theNazi takeover, the inaugural pleasures of exercising power (particularlythe countless attacks unleashed against the regime s real and imaginedopponents, especially by the SA) had eventually evaporated.On theother hand, these widespread acts of misconduct perpetrated by Nazifunctionaries had caused a considerable drop in the social prestige ofthe Party and its little Hitlers.As the officials of the Nazi movementcame into the crosshairs of blanket criticisms directed at the Party, thepleasure of holding office must have lost its shine, especially for thecadres of subaltern functionaries who were particularly exposed to suchcomplaints.65Although the Nazi Party was keen to publicly condemn functionar-ies who were guilty of misconduct, especially acts of financial fraud,66this failed to staunch the loss of respect for the Party, as eloquentlydescribed by the exile reports of the Social Democrats.In January 1935,they reported no less than 21 cases, more or less publicly exposed, ofcorruption and embezzlement by functionaries of the Party and theNational Socialist Volkswohlfahrt ( People s Relief Agency ),67 solelywithin the framework of that year s annual campaign to collect dona-tions for the Winterhilfswerk ( Winter Relief Campaign ).68 A year later,the same period still saw 16 cases, which was not much of an improve-ment.69 There were more and more reports of fraud and embezzlementby members of the Winterhilfswerk, ranging from grassroots solicitors 220 Daniel Mühlenfeldto regional officials, in amounts of just a few Reichmarks to upwardsof 30,000.In 1934, the Nazi Kreisleiter of Meißen committed suicidebecause his fraud had been uncovered.In the small Pomeranian townof Gartz, the local manager of the Winterhilfswerk embezzled funds andwas also guilty of the sexual coercion of single and needy women inthe course of his duties.70 In the context of the aforementioned con-nection between (on the one hand) the soldierly habitus and (on theother hand) military and sexual violence, as witnessed even withinthe German army,71 it could be argued with great cynicism that thesecrimes might ultimately suggest the uninterrupted propagation ofthe National Socialist self-image of the political soldier , taken to theextreme.Furthermore, although such cases were condemned and punished bythe Party, public opinion hardly differentiated if at all between themand cases of National Socialist political patronage,72 which from theParty s point of view were not to be seen as the awarding of sinecures,but rather as appropriate material compensation for injustices allegedlycaused by the Weimar state
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